Four Africans arrested in Japan for money-laundering

Police in Japan acting on an FBI request have arrested six people -- three Nigerians, one Ghanaian and two Japanese nationals -- in a money-laundering case, officials said Thursday.

The six are suspected of having received funds that were the proceeds of a crime, wired to them from a New York Citibank account in the name of the National Bank of Ethiopia, Japan's Metropolitan Police Department said.

Police said they had arrested a Nigerian citizen, Nyeche Obeneme, 36, living in Saitama, north of Tokyo, and two other Nigerian men as well as a Ghanaian man, and a Japanese man and woman.

Police suspect the six between them received up to 200 million yen (2.4 million dollars) in October 2008, allowing the money to be wired into their bank accounts in return for commissions.

The money is believed to be part of roughly 33 million dollars that were wired to accounts in seven countries, also including China, South Korea and Australia, Kyodo News reported.

"With the help of the FBI, we made the arrests on alleged violations of the organised crime law," the police spokesman said, referring to the US Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Source: Daily Notion

FATF Public Statement

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the global standard setting body for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). In order to protect the international financial system from ML/FT risks and to encourage greater compliance with the AML/CFT standards, the FATF identified jurisdictions that have strategic deficiencies and works with them to address those deficiencies that pose a risk to the international financial system.

Jurisdictions subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the on-going and substantial money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risks emanating from the jurisdictions*.

Iran

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that have not made sufficient progress in addressing the deficiencies or have not committed to an action plan developed with the FATF to address the deficiencies** The FATF calls on its members to consider the risks arising from the deficiencies associated with each jurisdiction, as described below.

Bolivia
Cuba**
Ethiopia
Kenya
Myanmar
Sri Lanka
Syria
Turkey


* The FATF has previously issued public statements calling for counter-measures on Iran and DPRK. Those statements are updated below.
**Cuba has not engaged with the FATF in the process.


Iran

The FATF remains concerned by Iran’s failure to meaningfully address the on-going and substantial deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. The FATF remains particularly concerned about Iran’s failure to address the risk of terrorist financing and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF urges Iran to immediately and meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies, in particular by criminalising terrorist financing and effectively implementing suspicious transaction reporting (STR) requirements.

The FATF reaffirms its call on members and urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with Iran, including Iranian companies and financial institutions. In addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF reaffirms its 25 February 2009 call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures to protect their financial sectors from money laundering and financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks emanating from Iran. FATF continues to urge jurisdictions to protect against correspondent relationships being used to bypass or evade counter-measures and risk mitigation practices and to take into account ML/FT risks when considering requests by Iranian financial institutions to open branches and subsidiaries in their jurisdiction. If Iran fails to take concrete steps to improve its AML/CFT regime, the FATF will consider calling on its members and urging all jurisdictions to strengthen counter-measures in October 2011.

Cuba

Cuba has not committed to the AML/CFT international standards, nor has it constructively engaged with the FATF. The FATF has identified Cuba as having strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that pose a risk to the international financial system. The FATF urges Cuba to develop an AML/CFT regime in line with international standards, and is ready to work with the Cuban authorities to this end.

Bolivia

Despite Bolivia’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFISUD to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Bolivia has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Bolivia should work on addressing these deficiencies including by: (1) ensuring adequate criminalisation of money laundering (Recommendation 1); (2) adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); (3) establishing and implementing an adequate legal framework for identifying and freezing terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); and (4) establishing a fully operational and effective Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26). The FATF encourages Bolivia to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan, including by continuing to work on its AML/CFT legislation.

Ethiopia

Despite Ethiopia’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Ethiopia has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Ethiopia should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing (Recommendation 1 and Special Recommendation II); (2) establishing and implementing an adequate legal framework and procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); (3) ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26); (4) raising awareness of AML/CFT issues within the law enforcement community (Recommendation 27); and (5) implementing effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in order to deal with natural or legal persons that do not comply with the national AML/CFT requirements (Recommendation 17). The FATF encourages Ethiopia to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.

Kenya

Despite Kenya’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Kenya has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Kenya should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); (2) ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26); (3) establishing and implementing an adequate legal framework for identifying and freezing terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); (4) raising awareness of AML/CFT issues within the law enforcement community (Recommendation 27); and (5) implementing effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in order to deal with natural or legal persons that do not comply with the national AML/CFT requirements (Recommendation 17). The FATF encourages Kenya to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan, including by implementing the AML legislation and operationalising the new AML Advisory Board.

Myanmar

Myanmar has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by clarifying the scope of the ML offence. Despite Myanmar’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Myanmar has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Myanmar should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); (2) establishing and implementing adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); (3) further strengthening the extradition framework in relation to terrorist financing (Recommendation 35 and Special Recommendation I); (4) ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26); (5) enhancing financial transparency (Recommendation 4); and (6) strengthening customer due diligence measures (Recommendation 5). The FATF encourages Myanmar to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.

Sri Lanka

Despite Sri Lanka’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Sri Lanka has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Sri Lanka should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing (Recommendation 1 and Special Recommendation II); and (2) establishing and implementing adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III). The FATF encourages Sri Lanka to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan, including by continuing to work on its AML/CFT legislation.

Syria

Syria has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by improving the ML and TF offences. Despite Syria’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain Syria should work on addressing its deficiencies, including by: (1) adopting adequate measures to implement and enforce the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (Special Recommendation I); (2) implementing adequate procedures for identifying and freezing terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); (3) ensuring financial institutions are aware of and comply with their obligations to file suspicious transaction reports in relation to ML and FT (Recommendation 13 and Special Recommendation IV); and (4) ensuring appropriate laws and procedures are in place to provide mutual legal assistance (Recommendations 36-38, Special Recommendation V). The FATF encourages Syria to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.

Turkey

Turkey has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by working on CFT legislation. Despite Turkey’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Turkey has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Turkey should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); and (2) implementing an adequate legal framework for identifying and freezing terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III). The FATF encourages Turkey to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.

Source: FATF

Ethiopia - House passes 'anti-money laundering' bill

The New legislation the national bank says will prevent money laundering was approved by parliament this week.

Money laundering is investing money obtained from serious crimes, such as drug trafficking or terrorist activity, into legal enterprises.

All parliamentary groups say a bill is necessary; however, they are concerned with some of its articles.

The main concern is that the bill allows the undermining of doctor-patient, lawyer-client and even legal proclamations and agreements that protect parties from being forced to disclose information about their interactions with clients, if it is believed it would advance an investigation of the Financial Intelligence Center, a federal agency that will be established by the new bill.

The bill also stipulates that suspicious transactions - defined by the bill as those found to be inconsistent with a customer's known legitimate business or personal activities - will be looked into and involved parties will be forced to aide investigations and explain the source.

"It is on the prosecutor that the burden of the proof should rely, not on possible citizens that are all potentially innocent until proven otherwise," MP Temesgen Zewdie said, reflecting some of the opposition MP's concerns regarding the bill they see as awarding too much power to the executive.

Despite the opposition group's refusal to support it, the majority ruling party MPs, aided by some affiliated and independent groups, wrote the bill into law last Thursday.

Source: Nazret

Ethiopia - 'Canadian Islamists' flee from Somalia

Joseph Brean
National Post

Wednesday, January 03, 2007

Canadian authorities were investigating reports yesterday that an alleged Islamist fighter presented a Canadian passport when he was arrested on Monday while trying to flee war-torn Somalia through a Kenyan border crossing.

The Standard newspaper of Kenya reported that the man, an Ethiopian national, is a military commander of the Ogaden National Liberation Front, an Ethiopian separatist group that has sided with the Somalian Islamic Courts Union in its war with Ethiopia. The unnamed Ethiopian reportedly presented a Canadian passport when he was arrested at Liboi, the main border crossing between Somalia and Kenya.

The Kenyan Daily Nation newspaper reported that 10 suspected fighters were carrying large amounts of foreign currency when they attempted to make the crossing in a four-wheel drive vehicle and that they were "suspected by Kenyan security agencies to double as financiers of the Islamic Courts Union."

Other media reports, quoting local sources, said there were eight men in total -- two claiming to be Canadian, the rest Eritrean. They are being held at Garissa, a city closer to the capital, Nairobi.

"It's one thing having a Canadian passport, and it's another thing making sure that you correspond to the passport," said Rejean Beaulieu, a Foreign Affairs spokesman in Ottawa.

He said there are only two Canadians in Somalia who are registered with Ottawa, despite a travel advisory that urges Canadians not to travel there.

"But it doesn't mean there are not more. Many people around the world don't necessarily register with us," he said.

Kenyan authorities have anticipated an exodus of as many as 3,000 defeated militiamen loyal to the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an alliance of Muslim fundamentalists that wielded a shaky power over Somalia until last week.

After defeating a U.S.-backed alliance of warlords in June to take the capital, Mogadishu, the ICU rose to power throughout the south of the country, eventually seizing the port of Kismayo, which left the interim government -- supported by Ethiopia and recognized internationally -- confined to Baidoa, an inland commercial centre.

On Nov. 25 last year, a communique issued by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad, the ICU's leader, was posted to Internet message boards, calling jihadists from around the world to come fight against Ethiopia, which he said was engaged in the same "crusade war waged against Iraq and Afghanistan, and the previous war in Somalia."

The month before, the National Post reported that the ICU is composed partly of Somali- Canadians from Toronto or Ottawa who have returned to their homeland.

The highest-ranking Canadian is Abdullahi Ali Afrah, second deputy chairman of the Islamic Courts advisory body. In Toronto, he worked at the Canadian branch of Al-Barakaat, a money-transfer outlet implicated in terrorist financing.

The ICU was defeated by Ethiopian troops in a war that began Christmas Eve with the strafing of Mogadishu's airport by Ethiopian jets. Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, said his country intervened to "protect the sovereignty of the nation and to blunt repeated attacks by Islamic Courts terrorists and anti-Ethiopian elements they are supporting."

Troops of Somalia's interim government, backed by Ethiopia, retook Mogadishu four days later, prompting an exodus of fighters loyal to the ICU.

The day before, forces of the Ogaden National Liberation Front -- which waged a long and often violent campaign for independence from Ethiopia before allying themselves with the ICU -- intercepted an Ethiopian military convoy of more than 20 vehicles, destroying four of them and forcing the remainder to retreat, according to the Sudan Times.

On Christmas Day, Eritrean radio reported that the ONLF attacked another Ethiopian convoy, killing as many as 500 soldiers. And yesterday, an Ogaden Web site, quoting locals, said the ONLF launched a surprise attack on two Ethiopian military personnel carriers, killing their occupants.

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