FATF Public Statement

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the global standard setting body for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). In order to protect the international financial system from ML/FT risks and to encourage greater compliance with the AML/CFT standards, the FATF identified jurisdictions that have strategic deficiencies and works with them to address those deficiencies that pose a risk to the international financial system.

Jurisdictions subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the on-going and substantial money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risks emanating from the jurisdictions*.

Iran

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that have not made sufficient progress in addressing the deficiencies or have not committed to an action plan developed with the FATF to address the deficiencies** The FATF calls on its members to consider the risks arising from the deficiencies associated with each jurisdiction, as described below.

Bolivia
Cuba**
Ethiopia
Kenya
Myanmar
Sri Lanka
Syria
Turkey


* The FATF has previously issued public statements calling for counter-measures on Iran and DPRK. Those statements are updated below.
**Cuba has not engaged with the FATF in the process.


Iran

The FATF remains concerned by Iran’s failure to meaningfully address the on-going and substantial deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. The FATF remains particularly concerned about Iran’s failure to address the risk of terrorist financing and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF urges Iran to immediately and meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies, in particular by criminalising terrorist financing and effectively implementing suspicious transaction reporting (STR) requirements.

The FATF reaffirms its call on members and urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with Iran, including Iranian companies and financial institutions. In addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF reaffirms its 25 February 2009 call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures to protect their financial sectors from money laundering and financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks emanating from Iran. FATF continues to urge jurisdictions to protect against correspondent relationships being used to bypass or evade counter-measures and risk mitigation practices and to take into account ML/FT risks when considering requests by Iranian financial institutions to open branches and subsidiaries in their jurisdiction. If Iran fails to take concrete steps to improve its AML/CFT regime, the FATF will consider calling on its members and urging all jurisdictions to strengthen counter-measures in October 2011.

Cuba

Cuba has not committed to the AML/CFT international standards, nor has it constructively engaged with the FATF. The FATF has identified Cuba as having strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that pose a risk to the international financial system. The FATF urges Cuba to develop an AML/CFT regime in line with international standards, and is ready to work with the Cuban authorities to this end.

Bolivia

Despite Bolivia’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFISUD to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Bolivia has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Bolivia should work on addressing these deficiencies including by: (1) ensuring adequate criminalisation of money laundering (Recommendation 1); (2) adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); (3) establishing and implementing an adequate legal framework for identifying and freezing terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); and (4) establishing a fully operational and effective Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26). The FATF encourages Bolivia to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan, including by continuing to work on its AML/CFT legislation.

Ethiopia

Despite Ethiopia’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Ethiopia has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Ethiopia should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing (Recommendation 1 and Special Recommendation II); (2) establishing and implementing an adequate legal framework and procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); (3) ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26); (4) raising awareness of AML/CFT issues within the law enforcement community (Recommendation 27); and (5) implementing effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in order to deal with natural or legal persons that do not comply with the national AML/CFT requirements (Recommendation 17). The FATF encourages Ethiopia to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.

Kenya

Despite Kenya’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Kenya has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Kenya should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); (2) ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26); (3) establishing and implementing an adequate legal framework for identifying and freezing terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); (4) raising awareness of AML/CFT issues within the law enforcement community (Recommendation 27); and (5) implementing effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in order to deal with natural or legal persons that do not comply with the national AML/CFT requirements (Recommendation 17). The FATF encourages Kenya to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan, including by implementing the AML legislation and operationalising the new AML Advisory Board.

Myanmar

Myanmar has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by clarifying the scope of the ML offence. Despite Myanmar’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Myanmar has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Myanmar should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); (2) establishing and implementing adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); (3) further strengthening the extradition framework in relation to terrorist financing (Recommendation 35 and Special Recommendation I); (4) ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26); (5) enhancing financial transparency (Recommendation 4); and (6) strengthening customer due diligence measures (Recommendation 5). The FATF encourages Myanmar to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.

Sri Lanka

Despite Sri Lanka’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Sri Lanka has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Sri Lanka should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing (Recommendation 1 and Special Recommendation II); and (2) establishing and implementing adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III). The FATF encourages Sri Lanka to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan, including by continuing to work on its AML/CFT legislation.

Syria

Syria has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by improving the ML and TF offences. Despite Syria’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain Syria should work on addressing its deficiencies, including by: (1) adopting adequate measures to implement and enforce the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (Special Recommendation I); (2) implementing adequate procedures for identifying and freezing terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); (3) ensuring financial institutions are aware of and comply with their obligations to file suspicious transaction reports in relation to ML and FT (Recommendation 13 and Special Recommendation IV); and (4) ensuring appropriate laws and procedures are in place to provide mutual legal assistance (Recommendations 36-38, Special Recommendation V). The FATF encourages Syria to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.

Turkey

Turkey has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by working on CFT legislation. Despite Turkey’s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Turkey has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Turkey should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); and (2) implementing an adequate legal framework for identifying and freezing terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III). The FATF encourages Turkey to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.

Source: FATF

US maintains Cuba, Iran, Sudan, Syria on terror sponsors' list

The US has retained Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria on the list nations which allegedly sponsor of terrorism.

The State Department retained these four countries in this list after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton determined that the government of these nations has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

As a result, these countries would face a wide range of sanctions including a ban on arms-related exports and sales; controls over exports of dual-use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist-list country's military capability or ability to support terrorism; prohibitions on economic assistance and imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.

Designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1982, the Government of Cuba maintained a public stance against terrorism and terrorist financing in 2010, but there was no evidence that it had severed ties with elements from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and recent media reports indicate some current and former members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty continue to reside in Cuba, the State Department said.

Iran, designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984, remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2010.

Tehran's financial, material, and logistic support for terrorist and militant groups throughout the Middle East and Central Asia had a direct impact on international efforts to promote peace, threatened economic stability in the Gulf, and undermined the growth of democracy, it said.

In 2010, Iran remained the principal supporter of groups implacably opposed to the Middle East Peace Process, it added. Sudan, which was designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1993, the State Department said remained a cooperative partner in global counter-terrorism efforts against al-Qaida in 2010.

During the past year, the Government of Sudan worked actively to counter AQ operations that posed a potential threat to US interests and personnel in Sudan.

Sudanese officials have indicated that they viewed continued cooperation to the US as important and recognized the potential benefits of American training and information-sharing.

Syria was designated as the State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1979. In 2010, it continued its political support to a variety of terrorist groups affecting the stability of the region and beyond, the report said.

The State Department said Syria provided political and weapons support to Hizballah in Lebanon and allowed Iran to resupply the terrorist organization with weapons.

The external leadership of Hamas, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, among others, were based in Damascus and operated within Syria's borders.

Statements supporting terrorist groups like Hamas and Hizballah consistently permeated government speeches and press statements, it said.

Source: Deccan Herald

FinCEN Guidance to Financial Institutions on Recent Events and the Commercial Bank of Syria

FinCEN Advisory

FIN-2011-A013
Issued:	August 10, 2011
Subject:	Guidance to Financial Institutions on the Commercial Bank of Syria

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In coordination with Wednesday's designation of the Commercial Bank of Syria for its provision of financial services to entities previously sanctioned by the United States for their proliferation activities, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is issuing this Advisory today to alert U.S. financial institutions of information on the Commercial Bank of Syria's continued involvement in illicit financial activities.

On March 15, 2006, FinCEN issued a Final Rule under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act prohibiting U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining a correspondent account in the United States for or on behalf of the Commercial Bank of Syria, directly or indirectly, and requiring all covered financial institutions to review their account records to ensure they do not maintain accounts directly for, or on behalf of, the Commercial Bank of Syria¹. This Final Rule followed a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) and Finding on May 18, 2004, which determined that the Commercial Bank of Syria was (1) used by persons associated with terrorist organizations; and (2) used as a conduit for the laundering of proceeds generated from the illicit sale of Iraqi oil.²

Since this Final Rule was issued, the Commercial Bank of Syria has engaged in transactions with multiple proliferation-related entities, including several named in U.S., EU, and UN sanctions, which led to today's designation of the Commercial Bank of Syria pursuant to U.S. counter-proliferation sanctions authorities. The Commercial Bank of Syria is believed to have been used by a provider of lethal support to Al -Qa'ida in Iraq.

Guidance

U.S. financial institutions are reminded that the Final Rule mentioned above imposed the fifth special measure under Section 311, prohibiting U.S. financial institutions from maintaining correspondent accounts for the Commercial Bank of Syria. While the Commercial Bank of Syria no longer maintains direct correspondent relationships with U.S. banks, financial institutions are reminded of their continuing obligation to exercise due diligence with respect to their correspondent accounts that is reasonably designed to guard against indirect use of those accounts by the Commercial Bank of Syria.³ Contrary to what might be expected, financial institutions are advised that the Commercial Bank of Syria continues to maintain U.S. dollar-denominated accounts at various banks throughout Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

Financial institutions are advised that the Commercial Bank of Syria may attempt to circumvent the prohibitions in the special measure through "nested account" activity. Such activity generally involves a financial institution gaining anonymous access to a financial system by operating through a domestic correspondent account belonging to a third party foreign financial institution rather than maintaining its own correspondent account. Examples of potentially suspicious activity related to nested accounts may include, but are not limited to:

• Transactions to and from jurisdictions in which the foreign financial institution has no known business activities or interests.


• Transactions in which the total volume and frequency exceeds expected activity for the foreign financial institution, considering its customer base or asset size.

In addition to the requirements under the Final Rule discussed above, FinCEN reminds U.S. financial institutions of their requirement under the BSA to report suspicious transactions conducted or attempted by, at, or through the U.S. financial institution.⁴ A transaction is suspicious if it (a) involves funds derived from illegal activity, (b) is indicative of structuring, money laundering, terrorist financing, or any other violation of federal law or regulation, or (c) has no business or apparent lawful purpose, or is not the sort in which the customer is normally expected to engage, and the financial institution knows of no reasonable explanation for the transaction after examining the available facts.⁵

Questions or comments regarding the contents of this advisory should be addressed to the FinCEN Regulatory Helpline at 800-949-2732.

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¹ See generally 71 FR 13260, "Financial Crimes Enforcement Network: Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations - Imposition of Special Measure Against Commercial Bank of Syria, Including Its Subsidiary, Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank, as a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern," [Final Rule] (March 15, 2006).http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/pdf/noticeoffinalrule03152006.pdf. ² See generally, 69 FR 28098, "Financial Crimes Enforcement Network: Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations - Imposition of Special Measure Against Commercial Bank of Syria, Including Its Subsidiary, Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank, as a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern," [Notice of Proposed Rulemaking] (May 18, 2004).http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/pdf/311syrianprm.pdf. ³ 31 CFR 1010.653(b)(2).⁴ A transaction is suspicious if it falls within one of the categories enumerated in our suspicious activity reporting (SAR) rules. A transaction requires reporting if the transaction satisfies the monetary threshold in our SAR rules, and the financial institution "knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect" that the transaction is suspicious. Financial institutions should note that our rules allow for the voluntary filing of SARs. See, e.g., 31 CFR 1020.320.

⁵ Id.

FinCEN Advisory

FIN-2011-A010
Issued:	July 8, 2011
Subject:	Guidance to Financial Institutions on Recent Events in Syria

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The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is issuing this Advisory to U.S. financial institutions to take reasonable risk-based steps with respect to the potential increased movement of assets that may be related to the current unrest in Syria.¹ During this period of uncertainty, FinCEN is issuing this Advisory to remind U.S. financial institutions of their requirement to apply enhanced scrutiny for private banking accounts held by or on behalf of senior foreign political figures² and to monitor transactions that could potentially represent misappropriated or diverted state assets, proceeds of bribery or other illegal payments, or other public corruption proceeds.

Financial institutions should be aware of the possible impact the events in Syria may have on patterns of financial activity when assessing risks related to particular customers and transactions. For example, as a result of the unrest in Syria, information available to the U.S. Government indicates Rami Makhluf, a cousin to Syrian President Bashar Assad and prominent Syrian businessman, is taking steps to protect his money, properties and companies. Rami Makhluf was designated by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on February 21, 2008 for improperly benefiting from and aiding the public corruption of Syrian regime officials.³ On May 18, 2011, OFAC also designated three companies and one individual for their links to Makhluf: Cham Holding and its Chairman Nabil Rafik al Kuzbari, Bena Properties, and Al Mashreq Investment Fund.⁴ Further, on July 10, 2008, OFAC identified Syriatel and Ramak, two companies in which Makhluf owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest.⁵

The U.S. Government has reason to believe that Rami Makhluf is disassociating himself (in name only) from his businesses and looking to safely store his wealth outside of Syria. Financial institutions should be aware of risks associated with conducting transactions linked to Makhluf, as well as the requirements for enhanced scrutiny for private banking accounts held by or on behalf of senior foreign political figures under the Bank Secrecy Act.⁶

Guidance

If a financial institution knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect that a transaction relating to senior foreign political figures involves funds derived from illicit activity, if the transaction appears to have no business or lawful purpose, or if a customer has engaged in activities indicative of money laundering, terrorist financing, or any other violation of federal law or regulation, the financial institution must file a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR).⁷ Additionally, covered financial institutions are reminded of the regulations implementing Section 312 of the USA PATRIOT Act, (31 U.S.C. 5318(i)), which require a written due diligence program for private banking accounts held for non-U.S. persons designed to detect and report any known or suspected money laundering or other suspicious activity.⁸ In instances where senior foreign political figures maintain private banking accounts at a covered institution, those financial institutions are required to apply enhanced scrutiny of such accounts to detect and report transactions that may involve the proceeds of foreign corruption. ⁹

In April 2008, FinCEN issued Guidance to assist financial institutions on reporting suspicious activity regarding proceeds of foreign corruption. That Guidance also highlights potential indicators of transactions that may be related to proceeds of foreign corruption.¹⁰In May 2011, FinCEN released a SAR Activity Review - Trends Tips and Issues specifically on foreign corruption, which highlights general regulatory requirements, general due diligence procedures, and frequently asked questions related to senior foreign political figures and corruption.¹¹ Financial institutions may find the Guidance document and SAR Activity Review useful in assisting with suspicious activity monitoring and due diligence requirements related to senior foreign political figures.

Questions or comments regarding the contents of this advisory should be addressed to the FinCEN Regulatory Helpline at 800-949-2732.

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¹ For information from the United States Department of State regarding developments in Syria, please see http://www.travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1035.html. ² "Senior foreign political figure" means a current or former senior official of a foreign government or of a major foreign political party; a senior executive of a foreign government-owned commercial enterprise; a corporation, business, or other entity that has been formed by, or for the benefit of, any such individual; the immediate family members of any such individual; and a person who is widely and publicly known (or is actually known by the relevant covered financial institution) to be a close associate of such individual. For the purposes of this definition, "senior official or executive" means an individual with substantial authority over policy, operations, or the use of government-owned resources and "immediate family member" means spouses, parents, siblings, children and a spouse's parents and siblings. See 31 CFR 1010.620(c) and 31 CFR 1010.605(p). ³ Office of Foreign Assets Control, "Changes to List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons Since January 1, 2008." (February 21, 2008).http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Documents/sdnew08.pdf, and see generally, HP-834, "Rami Makhluf Designated for Benefiting from Syrian Corruption" (February 21, 2008). http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp834.aspx.⁴ Office of Foreign Assets Control, "Changes to List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons Since January 1, 2011." (May 18, 2011).http://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/t11sdnew.pdf, and see generally,TG-1181, "Administration Takes Additional Steps to Hold the Government of Syria Accountable for Violent Repression Against the Syrian People" (May 18, 2011).http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1181.aspx.⁵ Office of Foreign Assets Control, "Changes to List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons Since January 1, 2008." (July 10, 2008). http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1075.aspx, and see generally, HP-1075, "Treasury Targets Rami Makhluf's Companies" (July 10, 2008). http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1075.aspx. ⁶ See 31 CFR 1010.620(c) and 31 CFR 1010.605(p). ⁷ See, e.g., 31 CFR § 1020.320. ⁸ See, generally, 31 CFR 1010.620.⁹ 31 CFR 1010.620(c).¹⁰ See "Guidance to Financial Institutions on Filing Suspicious Activity Reports Regarding the Proceeds of Foreign Corruption," FIN-2008-G005 (April 17, 2008).http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/html/fin-2008-g005.html. 

¹¹ The SAR Activity Review - Trends Tips & Issues, Issue 19 (May 2011) [Published under the auspices of the BSA Advisory Group],http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_19.pdf. 

Syrians accused of money laundering for terrorists arrested in Spain

July 26, 2007

Two Syrians alleged to be laundering money for international terrorists were arrested in Spain's capital Madrid, Spanish police said Wednesday.

Bassan Dalati Satut, 48, and Samer Dabbas, 30, both from the Syrian city of Aleppo, said that they were channeling money from Arab investors into Spain's construction sector.

The two men are accused of creating front companies which operated in the real estate sector to launder money contributed by members or supporters of radical Islamic organizations, a police statement said.

Satut is alleged to have been given the money-laundering job from Mohamed Ghaleb Kalaje Zouaydi, who is serving a nine-year prison term in Spain for helping plan the Sept. 11 attacks in New York and Washington.

Police also seized 120,000 euros (165,000 U.S. dollars), mobile phones and newspapers clippings about terror activities in an operation on Tuesday, the statement said.

Spanish police have increased their vigilance against Islamic terrorists since the March 11, 2004 attacks which killed 192 people in Madrid.

Source: Xinhua

http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/6224664.html

Senior Al Qaeda member killed in U.S. raid in Syria, officials say

Abu Ghadiyah was a key player in funneling foreign fighters to Iraq, a U.S. official says.

By Greg Miller and Josh Meyer
October 28, 2008

U.S. commandos crossing into Syria in an unprecedented raid this weekend killed a senior Al Qaeda associate accused of funneling fighters, weapons and cash to the insurgency in Iraq, U.S. officials familiar with the operation said Monday.

Abu Ghadiyah, the chief of a Syrian smuggling network who was killed in the controversial operation Sunday, was "one of the most prominent, if not the most prominent, facilitators of foreign fighters going into Iraq for Al Qaeda," a senior U.S. official said.

The raid was the latest sign that the U.S. is now willing to mount attacks in sovereign nations in pursuit of insurgent groups operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as those who support them. Last month, U.S. special operations forces carried out a similar raid in the tribal border region of Pakistan, drawing loud criticism from the Pakistani public and senior government officials in Islamabad, the capital.

Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem said the U.S. committed "criminal and terrorist aggression" by conducting a raid in which seven civilians died, including three children, a woman and a fisherman.

Two U.S. helicopters flew about five miles into Syria, he said, with one landing at a farm while the second provided cover. A villager told the Associated Press he saw at least two men taken into custody by U.S. forces and whisked away by helicopter. He spoke on condition of anonymity, saying he feared for his life.

U.S. officials did not say how many people died in the raid.

Abu Ghadiyah, an Iraqi native believed to be in his late 20s, has for several years been a key figure in the flow of foreign fighters and weapons into Iraq, American officials said.

"He comes from a family of smugglers," said the senior U.S. official. "He seems to have turned the family business toward the movement of terrorists, explosives, weapons, etc., into Iraq."

That official, along with others, spoke on condition of anonymity because of the classified nature of the operation.

Other than reporting Abu Ghadiyah's death, U.S. officials offered few details about the raid. Pentagon officials declined to comment. The rationale for using commandos was unclear.

Since the terrorist attacks on America in 2001, the United States has carried out dozens of missile strikes, mostly in Pakistan, but also in Yemen and elsewhere, aimed at killing Al Qaeda operatives. However, almost all of those operations have relied on CIA-operated Predator drones firing Hellfire antitank missiles.

The use of U.S. soldiers carries significantly greater risk and often leads to diplomatic strain, as has been the case with Pakistan.

U.S. counter-terrorism experts described Abu Ghadiyah, who is from Anbar province in western Iraq, as the head of a successful terrorist financial network supporting Iraq's Sunni Arab-led insurgency and a close associate of Al Qaeda in Iraq leaders.

"He's the classic example of a terrorist facilitator and financier," said Matthew Levitt, who from 2005 to early 2007 helped oversee a U.S. government crackdown on Abu Ghadiyah's financial network while deputy assistant secretary for intelligence and analysis at the Treasury Department.

However, Abu Ghadiyah's death is unlikely to decimate the network because of its strong funding streams and because other members, including a brother, have been active, said Levitt, now with the Institute for Near East Policy, a Washington-based think tank.

The Treasury Department had previously imposed financial sanctions on Abu Ghadiyah and family members, saying they facilitated and controlled the flow of money, weapons, terrorists and other resources through Syria to Iraq.

The effectiveness of such financial enforcement actions has been questioned. The actions target militants and those providing financial or material support, freezing any known assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting U.S. firms and individuals from doing business with them.

U.S. officials said Abu Ghadiyah, a nickname for Badran Turki Hishan Mazidih, was appointed by former Al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab Zarqawi to be the group's Syrian commander for logistics in 2004. After Zarqawi's death in 2006, Abu Ghadiyah began working for the new leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Ayyub Masri, according to U.S. officials.

Abu Ghadiyah provided and arranged false passports, weapons, guides, safe houses and allowances to foreign terrorists preparing to enter Iraq, Treasury officials said.

U.S. officials maintain that Syria has long functioned as a hub for terrorist financing in Iraq, coordinating the movement of recruits and money between cells in Europe and Ansar al Islam training camps in northern Iraq.

In Baghdad, the Shiite Muslim-led Iraqi government said it wanted good ties with Syria but that Damascus needed to do more to stop fighters from slipping across its borders.

Iraqi government spokesman Ali Dabbagh described the region targeted by the Americans as the "scene for many terrorist activities of the last few months," including the killing of 13 policemen in an Iraqi border village in Anbar province. Staunch Syrian ally Iran, which holds enormous sway over the Baghdad government and opposes the U.S. troop presence in Iraq, condemned the U.S. operation.

"We condemn any attack which leads to the killing of innocents and civilians," Foreign Ministry official Hassan Qashqavi told reporters in Tehran.

Miller and Meyer are Times staff writers.

greg.miller@latimes.com

josh.meyer@latimes.com

Times staff writers Ned Parker and Saif Hameed in Baghdad, Borzou Daragahi in Beirut and Julian E. Barnes in Washington and special correspondent Ramin Mostaghim in Tehran contributed to this report.

Source: LA Times

Spain clears Syrians of terror financing

A Spanish court has cleared two Syrian-born men of indictments for alleged terrorist financing, according to court documents viewed by CNN on Monday.

The indictments, issued last year, were dropped last week against Bassam Dalati Satut and Mohamed Ghaleb Kalaje Zouaydi, although Kalaje is still serving a nine-year sentence for membership in a terrorist group, from a conviction in 2005 in Spain, court and prison officials told CNN.

A three-judge panel at the National Court, which hears terrorism cases, cleared the two of indictments issued in April 2007, that had accused Kalaje of membership in a terrorist group and accused Satut of the lesser charge of collaboration with a terrorist group.

Satut was acquitted in 2005 of belonging to a terrorist group, at a trial in which 18 of the 24 defendants, including Kalaje, were convicted of Islamic terrorist activities, court records show.

Spain's Supreme Court in 2006 overturned three of the lower court's convictions from that 2005 sentence, leaving 15 convicted, in what was one of Europe's largest trials involving operatives allegedly linked to al Qaeda.

In the latest case, the alleged crime of Satut and Kalaje, according to the indictments, was liquidating a company's accounts of thousands of dollars and allegedly diverting the funds to finance Islamic terrorist activities.

The National Court threw out the indictments on Thursday but the ruling did not became available to the media until Monday.

In clearing Satut and Kalaje, the court said the indictments were not backed by sufficient evidence to show that the two suspects, especially Kalaje - who was in prison on a prior terrorism conviction - had carried out terrorist financing.

Source: CNN

International Arms Dealer Extradited on Terrorism Offenses

U.S. Department of Justice

**Verbatim

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Friday, June 13, 2008
WWW.USDOJ.GOV

NEW YORK- Michael J. Garcia, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Michele M. Leonhart, the Acting Administrator of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), announced that international arms dealer Monzer Al Kassar, a/k/a Abu Munawar, a/k/a El Taous, arrived in New York today after being extradited from Spain on federal terrorism charges. Al Kassar was extradited to New York for his participation in a conspiracy to sell millions of dollars worth of weapons to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (the FARC) -- a designated foreign terrorist organization -- to be used to kill Americans in Colombia. Al Kassar’s co-defendants, Tareq Mousa Al Ghazi and Luis Felipe Moreno Godoy, were both previously extradited to New York from Romania to face the same terrorism charges. According to the superseding Indictment filed in Manhattan federal court:

Since the early 1970s, Al Kassar has been a source of weapons and military equipment for armed factions engaged in violent conflicts around the world. Some of these factions have included known terrorist organizations, such as the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), the goals of which included attacking United States interests and United States nationals.

To carry out his weapons-trafficking business, Al Kassar developed an international network of criminal associates, including co-defendants Al Ghazi and Moreno Godoy, as well as front companies and bank accounts in various countries, including the United Kingdom, Spain, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania. Additionally, Al Kassar has engaged in money-laundering transactions in bank accounts throughout the world to disguise the illicit nature of his criminal proceeds.

Between February 2006 and May 2007, Al Kassar agreed to sell to the FARC millions of dollars worth of weapons, including thousands of machine guns, millions of rounds of ammunition, rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs), and surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs). During a series of recorded telephone calls, e-mails, and in-person meetings, Al Kassar agreed to sell the weapons to two confidential sources working with the DEA (the CSs), who represented that they were acquiring these weapons for the FARC, with the specific understanding that the weapons were to be used to attack United States helicopters in Colombia.

During their consensually-recorded meetings, Al Kassar provided the CSs with, among other things: (1) a schematic of the vessel to be used to transport the weapons; (2) specifications for the SAMs he agreed to sell to the FARC; and (3) bank accounts in Spain and Lebanon that were ultimately used to receive and conceal more than $400,000 sent from DEA undercover accounts that the CSs represented were FARC drug proceeds for the weapons deal. During his meetings with the CSs, Al Kassar reviewed Nicaraguan end-user certificates that he accepted despite knowing that the arms were destined for the FARC in Colombia. Al Kassar also promised to provide the FARC with ton-quantities of C-4 explosives, as well as expert trainers from Lebanon to teach the FARC how to effectively use C-4 and improvised explosive devices (commonly referred to as IEDs). In addition, Al Kassar offered to send a thousand men to fight with the FARC against United States military officers in Colombia.

The Indictment charges Al Kassar with four separate terrorism offenses:

Count One: Conspiracy to kill United States nationals, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332(b);

Count Two: Conspiracy to kill United States officers or employees, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1114 and 1117;

Count Three: Conspiracy to acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332g; and

Count Four: Conspiracy to provide material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization, in violation of Title 18,

United States Code, Section 2339B.

In addition, Al Kassar is charged in Count Five with money laundering, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956.

The superseding Indictment seeks the forfeiture of an estate located in Marbella, Spain, and all funds contained in three separate bank accounts. The forfeitures represent the alleged proceeds obtained from the charged offenses.

Al Kassar is expected to appear later this afternoon in Magistrate court in Manhattan federal court.

If convicted of Counts One through Three, Al Kassar faces a maximum sentence of any term of years or life imprisonment, as well as a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment on Count Three. As part of the extradition process, however, the United States has provided assurances to the government of Spain that it will not seek a life sentence for Al Kassar, but instead will ask for a prison term of years. If convicted of Count Four, Al Kassar faces a maximum sentence of 15 years' imprisonment. Finally, if convicted of Count Five, Al Kassar faces a maximum sentence of 20 years' imprisonment.

The international law enforcement operation that culminated with today’s extradition was the result of cooperation between the DEA, the Spanish National Police, and the Romanian Border Police.

Mr. Garcia praised the investigative efforts of the DEA, the Spanish National Police, and the Romanian Border Police. Mr. Garcia also thanked the United States Department of Justice’s Office of International Affairs and the U.S. State Department.

"Monzer Al Kassar intended to provide millions of dollars worth of lethal weapons to a foreign terrorist organization to be used to kill Americans," said U.S. Attorney Michael J. Garcia. "As a result of extraordinary cooperation with our international law enforcement partners, Al Kassar will now face justice for his crimes in a United States courtroom."

"The arrest, extradition and pending criminal prosecution of Monzer Al Kassar before a U.S. Court of justice are a testament to DEA's global alliances and unique investigative skills," said DEA Acting Administrator Michele M. Leonhart. "Al Kassar's days of arming and funding global terrorists are over. Spanish authorities are to be commended for their diligence and perseverance to ensure Al Kassar's extradition to the United States."

Assistant United States Attorneys Boyd M. Johnson III, Leslie C. Brown, and Brendan R. McGuire are in charge of the prosecutions.

The charges contained in the Indictment are merely accusations and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

US keeps Cuba on terrorism blacklist

The United States announced Thursday it has retained communist Cuba on a list of countries that allegedly support terrorism.

The State Department report lumping Cuba with Iran, Syria and Sudan was released weeks after US President Barack Obama made overtures to Havana, which is under a decades-old embargo, by lifting curbs on travel and money transfers.

Despite keeping Cuba on the blacklist, the report also highlighted positive steps taken by the government in Havana.

The report said "the Cuban government continued to provide safe haven to several terrorists," even if it "no longer actively supports" armed struggle beyond its shores.

It said members of the Basque separatist ETA, the Colombian rebel group FARC and the Colombian group ELN remained in Cuba last year after some arrived to help conduct peace negotiations with the governments of Spain and Colombia.

It also said that the government of President Raul Castro "continued to publicly defend the FARC," the Spanish acronym for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.

But it noted that on July 6 last year former president Fidel Castro urged the FARC to release the hostages they were holding without preconditions.

And Castro "has also condemned the FARC's mistreatment of captives and of their abduction of civilian politicians who had no role in the armed conflict," it added.

It said that the United States had "no evidence of terrorist-related money laundering or terrorist financing activities in Cuba," but pointed out that Cuba's banking systems remain among the most secretive and opaque in the world.

It also said Havana still allowed members of US militant groups like the Boricua Popular, or Macheteros, and the Black Liberation Army to live on its territory, even though they were fugitives from US justice.

"In keeping with its public declaration, the government has not provided safe haven to any new US fugitives wanted for terrorism since 2006," it added.

Source: AFP

FBI: Charities used to launder money

They talked in code. Cash was "gemoras." Money-laundering contacts were "washing machines." They met in cars, on a Brooklyn street corner, inside a bakery, and in a synagogue.

Tens of thousands of dollars in cash was transported in plastic bags, in boxes of Apple Jacks and Cinnabon Crunch cereal, and even a box decorated with Power Rangers stickers.

The men the FBI arrested July 23 and charged with being part of a massive international money-laundering scheme were, for all intent and purpose, "crime bosses," acting U.S. Attorney Ralph J. Marra Jr. said.

But at least several of them were, in fact, religious leaders in the tight-knit Syrian Jewish communities of Deal and Brooklyn, N.Y. They stand accused of using Jewish charities they controlled to launder millions of dollars in cash.

Court papers indicate that five rabbis and several other men were laundering money for an FBI cooperating witness who told them he needed to hide profits of his counterfeit handbag company, which produced knock-off versions of Prada, Gucci and Canali bags, which the witness said were sold for hundreds of dollars.

Sources have identified the witness as Solomon Dwek, 36, of Ocean Township, a disgraced real estate mogul who was arrested in May 2006 and charged with bank fraud. Dwek is accused of cashing a bad check for $25.2 million at a drive-in lane at PNC Bank branch in Eatontown. The bank spotted him the money, most of which he moved to other accounts. The bank was left with a $21 million loss when the check bounced, according to the FBI.

Brad Simon, a former federal prosecutor and assistant U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, said he is surprised the government's case appears to rely so heavily on the testimony of one key witness with a checkered past.

"This guy, at least from a defense attorney's point of view, seems like a treasure trove for defense purposes," said Simon, who is now a criminal defense attorney who represents clients accused of white collar crimes. "I would love to have the opportunity to cross-examine this guy."

Speaking to Brooklyn Rabbis Lavel Schwartz and Mordchai Fish in his car parked on a borough street in September 2008, the FBI's witness told them that a $50,000 check he was giving them to launder was "from the profits from the bags and the PNC," according to criminal complaints.

Fish, 56, and Schwartz, 57, both have been charged with money laundering.

The witness first infiltrated the money-laundering network, and then, in July 2007, began representing himself as a developer and the owner of a tile business to public officials in Hudson County, according to U.S. Attorney Marra.

The witness was eventually introduced to a web of public officials, council and mayoral candidates, and their associates, who took bribes in return for pledging their assistance in getting the witness's projects approved, or in steering contracts to him, Marra said.

When speaking to the targets of the money-laundering operation, Dwek openly discussed his bankruptcy problems, as well as the fact that he was involved in illegal businesses and bank frauds, according to sources and court records.

Dwek told the targets that his ongoing bankruptcy proceedings meant he had to conceal cash and assets, and that some of the money he needed to launder came from his "bank schnookie deals," a reference to bank fraud.

Prosecutors said they have hundreds of hours of video and audio recordings documenting much of the money laundering and bribes.

Marra called the money-laundering case "unprecedented" in the "number and prominence of the individuals involved."

The rabbis and their associates continued working with the witness even though they sometimes expressed concern about the possibility of getting caught.

In March, the witness was driving Fish to a Brooklyn meeting with Levi Deutsch, an Israeli who supplied cash for Fish's money-laundering operations. When the witness mentioned cross streets to which they were headed, Fish became nervous, according to court records.

"Don't even say the street. . . . in this car," Fish said, according to the complaints. The witness reassured Fish that "there's nothing. I had (the car) swept. Don't worry about it," to which Fish replied, "swept, shmept."

Latest corruption probe

The arrests marked the third phase of the "Operation Bid Rig," investigation by the FBI, the IRS Criminal Investigation Division and the U.S. Attorney's Office that began in Monmouth and Ocean counties 10 years ago.

The initial investigation became public in 2002 with the guilty plea of Ocean Township Mayor Terrence Weldon, who admitted extorting cash from several developers to influence approval of projects.

Forty-eight public officials have been convicted since the Operation Bid Rig investigation started in 1999.

On Thursday, another 44 people, including three mayors, two assemblymen, a Lakewood housing inspector and five rabbis were charged as part of a two-pronged investigation into political corruption and money laundering. Local Assemblyman Daniel M. Van Pelt, R-Ocean, was arrested on a charge of accepting $10,000 in a bribe.
Israeli cash

To start the money laundering, Dwek handed over checks — often made out to charities run by the religious leaders — and said they were proceeds of his illegal activities, sources and court papers indicate.

Three of the rabbis had connections to cash sources in Israel, and for a fee, those men in Israel made money available through "cash houses" run out of Brooklyn homes, offices and a bakery, according to court documents.

The men who ran those cash houses obtained the money at the direction of the co-conspirators in Israel, then gave the funds to the rabbis in Deal and Brooklyn, according to court papers.

The religious leaders took their cut, generally 10 percent, then turned over the remainder to the FBI witness, according to court papers.

During one meeting in Brooklyn, Eliahu Ben Haim, 58, of Long Branch, the principal rabbi of Congregation Ohel Yaacob in Deal who is accused of laundering $1.5 million, spoke with the witness about his cash source in Israel.

Ben Haim said he talked to the man every day or every other day, and said in the past four years, the Israeli man had the rabbi send out wires, under different names, all over the world, from Australia to New Zealand to Uganda, according to the FBI's complaint.

"It's unbelievable. I never saw anything like it," Ben Haim said, according to court documents. "I mean every country imaginable. Turkey, you can't believe it. . . . All different names. It's never the same name. . . . Switzerland, everywhere, France, everywhere, Spain . . . China, Japan."

In another method, the witness would bring a check to two other rabbis, Saul Kassin, 87, and Edmond Nahum, 56, principal rabbi at the Synagogue of Deal, according to prosecutors. Kassin is the spiritual leader of 75,000 Syrian Jews in Brooklyn.

Prosecutors said the rabbis would write the witness checks from a charity bank account for a slightly smaller amount, payable to the entity of his choice.

The witness then cashed the Kassin checks through Ben Haim, authorities said.

Criminal complaints say Kassin laundered more than $200,000 and Nahum laundered about $185,000.

Lawyers for the two men said they are innocent.

Nahum's attorney, Justin P. Walder, said the rabbi looks forward to clearing his name at trial. The rabbi has headed the Deal synagogue for many years, is well-established in the community and is married with four children, he said.

Walder did not mention Dwek by name, but said his client had been taken advantage of by a man who had known the rabbi for a long time.

"We intend to establish that his goodness was utilized by a person who was seeking to be absolved for his immense wrongful conduct by implicating another," Walder said. "Obviously, this man, under the system that exists in the federal court, the way he can get the best deal for himself is to implicate another, and obviously he took advantage of the rabbi."

Source: APP.COM

Alleged Hezbollah cell sold Canadian passport: FBI

The FBI has dismantled an alleged Hezbollah cell accused of arms dealing, depositing counterfeit money in a Canadian bank and selling a Canadian passport to support the Lebanese terrorist group.

Ten people from New York, New Jersey, Lebanon and Venezuela have been indicted and face up to 30 years in prison following an investigation that began in 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice announced on Tuesday.

The indictments link Hezbollah to a wide array of crimes, ranging from counterfeiting U.S. currency and money laundering to fencing stolen cars, cellular phones, laptops and Sony PlayStation 2 systems.

The case also implicates Iran and Syria in Hezbollah's illicit arms network. The suspects allegedly tried to ship guns to Latakia, a Syrian port they said was controlled by Hezbollah. And Hezbollah officials in Iran were allegedly involved in the weapons purchase.

During the investigation, one of the suspected ringleaders told an undercover agent that "Hezbollah receives a great deal of money from Iran" and "maintains small cells throughout the world." He cited the bombing of a Jewish centre in Argentina as an example.

"The allegations contained in this complaint demonstrate how terrorist organizations rely on a variety of underlying activities to fund and arm themselves," said David Kriss, the Assistant U.S. Attorney.

The group allegedly attempted to ship 1,200 Colt M-4 machine guns through Syria to Hezbollah. To raise money, it sold passports for $10,000, including a genuine Canadian passport into which a false page had been inserted.

A suspected ringleader of the group, Dib Hani Harb, is the son-in-law of Hassan Hodroj, a member of the Hezbollah Political Council. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah attended Mr. Harb's wedding.

Mr. Harb allegedly showed counterfeit U.S. currency to a witness, and said it had been manufactured in Iran. He said he had deposited $10,000 worth of the phony bills into a Canadian bank account.

Hezbollah is a militant Islamist group that is backed, trained and financed by Iran. It is a banned terrorist group under Canadian law. The Canadian government's official profile of Hezbollah accuses it of car bombings, hijackings and kidnappings in Western Europe, South America and Israel.

In a speech last month, RCMP Commissioner William Elliott warned that Hezbollah violence could spread to Canada. "While Hezbollah has not articulated any specific grievance with Canada, from its perspective any state that supports Israel or Israeli interests is the enemy, which casts a wide net," he said.

Charged are: Mr. Harb, Mr. Hodroj, Hasan Antar Karaki, Moussa Ali Hamdan, Hassan El-Najjar, Moustafa Habib Kassem, Latif Kamel Hazime, Alaa Allia Ahmed Mohamed, Maodo Kane and Michael Katz.

Source: National Post

sbell@nationalpost.com

Chicago federal jury acquits 2 men of laundering money for Hamas

Two men accused of furnishing money and fresh recruits to the militant Palestinian group Hamas were acquitted Thursday of racketeering but convicted on lesser charges.

The two men beamed broadly at the split verdict, and defense attorneys declared victory in the three-month trial that the government had described as a major component in its war on terrorism.

"We are not terrorists," former grocer Muhammad Salah said as he left the courthouse. "I feel good. I thank God, and I hope justice will prevail."

Salah, 53, of suburban Bridgeview, and Abdelhaleem Ashqar, 48, a onetime assistant business professor at Howard University in Washington, had been accused of laundering money for Hamas terrorists fighting to topple the Israeli government.

Defense attorneys portrayed the men as freedom fighters, comparing them to Nelson Mandela, Malcolm X and the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.

Salah and Ashqar, of Springfield, Va., have always denied belonging to Hamas. But they have made no secret of their dislike of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.

Salah was convicted of obstruction of justice for providing false answers to questions in a civil lawsuit filed by parents of an American teenager who was shot and killed by Hamas terrorists at an Israeli bus stop.

Ashqar was convicted of obstruction of justice and criminal contempt for refusing to testify before a federal grand jury after receiving immunity from prosecution for anything that he might have revealed.

The jury delivered the verdict amid heavy security in the courtroom after deliberating for 14 days. "We've convicted them - it's hard to say that we're disappointed," First Assistant U.S. Attorney Gary Shapiro said.

Defense attorneys said they hoped to have the convictions reversed on appeal but added that, at worst, the men would likely serve relatively short sentences.

"It is very hard for an American jury to find people guilty if they're fighting for their rights," said William Moffitt, Ashqar's attorney.

Also charged in the case is Abu Mousa Marzook, described as a fugitive living in Damascus, Syria, and one of the top leaders of Hamas. Prosecutors said it was Marzook who sent Salah on his mission to Israel and supplied him with money to give to Hamas leaders.

http://www.buffalonews.com/editorial/20070202/1033909.asp

Positive evaluation on Syria's Efforts in AML

Finance Minister Mohammad al-Hussein said Sunday that the international positive evaluation on Syria's efforts in combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism is a clear proof on the government seriousness in implementing international criterion in this regard.

A report for the Middle East and North African Financial Action Task Force ( MENAFATF) posted on the web hailed Syria's efforts in fighting money laundering and the financing of terrorism, pointing out to other procedures the Syrian government must adopt in this domain.

"The report content boosts confidence in the Syrian economy, particularly in the financial sector… the report unveils the falseness of some allegations that the Commercial Bank of Syria makes money laundering transactions," Minister Hussein added.

Adib Mayale, Governor of the Central Bank of Syria noted that "the report shows the Syrian authority's desire to find a preemptive apparatus to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism as well provide needed protection against social, political and economic dangers relating to financial crimes."

Syria has taken a number of procedures and issued several laws to fight money laundering, most importantly the legislative decree No. 33 for the year 2005.

http://www.sana.org/eng/24/2007/02/04/100696.htm

U.S. blacklists 3 Syrian organizations over WMD charges

WASHINGTON, Jan. 4 (Xinhua)

The U.S. Treasury Department blacklisted on Thursday three Syrian government organizations accused by the United States of proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

"Syria is using official government organizations to develop non-conventional weapons and the missiles to deliver them," said Stuart Levey, Treasury Department's under-secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence.

"We will continue to take action to prevent such state-sponsored WMD proliferators from using the international financial system," Levey said.

The three blacklisted government organizations are Syria's Higher Institute of Applied Science and Technology, Electronics Institute, and the National Standards and Calibration Laboratory.

Under U.S. laws, any U.S. assets belonging to the three Syrian organizations will be frozen and U.S. citizens are banned from conducting business transactions with them.

The United States has listed Syria as one of the "state sponsors of terrorism" and Syrian has been under U.S. sanctions.

Editor: Luan Shanglin

http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-01/05/content_5566995.htm